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Abstract. While a variety of studies analysed the benign effects of privatisation on firm 
performance under post-socialist transition using financial data very little is known about 
how the apparent productivity gains were achieved. This paper follows a weaving mill 
from 1998 to 1997 on its way of becoming a capitalist enterprise and gives a detailed 
account of the sources and limits of productivity growth. The data suggests that the 
factory was not far from the competitive optimum given the size of ‘plant and equipment’ 
- efficiency gains were mostly achieved by plant size reduction and asset stripping. The 
gains from this sort of initial restructuring helped many former state enterprises stay on 
the market but they did not necessarily indicate high levels of adaptability, capacity to 
innovate and ability to attract outside investors. In economies with many `seemingly 
restructured` privatised enterprises the elimination of the former state sector jobs is likely 
to continue within the private sector. The process may last for years after privatisation as 
a legal act had been fully accomplished. 
 
Contact: János Köllő, Institute of Economics, Budapest, H-1112 Budapest, Budaörsi út 
45, phone (361)-319 2654, email kollo@econ.core.hu 1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper follows a cotton-weaving mill located in western Hungary on its way of 
becoming a capitalist enterprise. The follow-up starts in 1988 (with some time series 
dating back to 1972 and even 1957) and lasts until 1997. At the end of the period the 
weaving plant was succesfully operating as part of a profitable corporation. The paper 
wants to describe what sorts of actions were required to transform the socialist plant to a 
capitalist one. Reading the time series backwards can also shed light on how an ill-
functioning socialist factory differed from a well-performing capitalist plant. 
The decisions on transformation were made at two levels. The goals set by the 
owners for plant managers were apparently simple and did not change during the period 
of observation: they were expected to minimise unit labor costs (ULC) taking the 
equipment at their disposal as given. The outcomes of cost-minimisation under a fixed 
amount of capital are conditional on the preferences and bargaining power of the 
workers, managers and the state as was shown by McDonald and Solow (1982) for firms 
bargaining with employment-aware unions, Carruth and Oswald (1985) for the case of 
selfish insiders, Svejnar (1982) for the labor-managed firm, and Prasnikar et al. (1994) 
for the case of three-party bargaining.  
The latter model - relevant for the socialist firm operating with a fixed amount of 
capital assets - predicts that the solution lies east of the demand curve, somewhere at a 
point similar to S on Figure 1, which turns out to yield low profits and ‘too high’ wages 
and employment as the transition begins. Moves from S to the competitive optimum (E) 
or any feasible points on the demand or contract curves imply cuts of labor input with or 
without accompanying cuts of wages. Though in the particular case of convex union  
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indifference curves there is a scope for Pareto improvement (points in the shaded area 
north-west of S) unilateral managerial decisions or ‘right to manage’ bargaining may lead 
to other outcomes like E or points between C and D on the demand curve, respectively.  
The plant under examination unquestionably moved from S towards E, a point where 
wages were at the disagreement level and labor input close to its optimum. The reduction 
in ULC, however, was predominantly accounted for by asset stripping and, much lesser 
degree, increases in sales prices due at least partly to better management, marketing and 
design In the context of Figure 1 it means that the decisive actions implied the re-scaling 
of the iso-profit map rather than moves on the original map. (When productivity and 
prices go up the profits generated at a given level of employment and wages also wind up 
so each contour represents higher profits). The aim of this paper is to precisely account 
with these moves and ‘parametric shifts’ and show how they contributed to the survival 
of the plant. 
Figure 1: Paths leading away from the pre-transiton optimum (S) 
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Is there a point in investigating these issues (any issue) by looking at a single case? I 
believe that a glimpse, or two, inside the black box is highly recommended. We do have 
evidence of productivity change in privatised and state-owned enterprises from studies 
using financial data (see for instance Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002 on the Czech Republic, 
Halpern and Kőrösi, 2000 on Hungary, and Pinto and Wijnbergen, 1995 on Poland) but 
these papers tell very little about the sources and limits of productivity growth. The 
admittedly casual evidence presented here raises two conjectures about the nature of 
efficiency gains at early stages of the transition.  
First, the data suggest that the factory under socialism was not very far from the 
competitive optimum given the size of plant and equipment. The plant, however, was 
heavily oversized as it employed many low-productivity workers and low-productivity 
looms. A major reduction of plant size with little space left for saving jobs by 
improvements in `X-efficiency’ (as called since the much debated classic by Harvey 
Leibeinstein, 1966) was an adequate answer to the challenges of competition. This, 
assuming that the case analysed in the paper is not unique, yields support to the approach 
of the optimal speed of transition models originating in a study by Aghion and Blanchard 
(1994). In their benchmark model the state sector is gradually closed without attempts to 
restructure and job losers move to the private sector via unemployment. The case of the 
weaving mill fits into this framework in that (to put it simply) no state sector jobs were, 
or could be, saved by better management or harder work. In the core of the 
transformation were pure reallocation with one part of the factory closed and the other 
part changing title.  
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Second, initial restructuring wherein large efficiency gains are achieved by asset 
stripping has implications for the path of transition. Fast-reforming economies produced a 
multitude of private enterprises by ‘title change combined with plant size reduction’ at 
early stages of the transformation. Initial restructuring certainly helped these firms stay 
on the market but their efficiency gains did not necessarily signal high levels of 
adaptability, capacity to innovate, or ability to attract outside investors – what the gains 
actually signaled was changes in the firm’s maximand, and the authority of the new 
owners and managers. In these economies, where past successes are particularly poor 
predictors of future viability, the elimination of the former state sector jobs is likely to 
continue within the private sector. This process may take years after privatisation as a 
legal act had been fully accomplished.  
2.  THE PLANT PRIOR TO RESTRUCTURING 
A weaving mill provides unique conditions for the study of transformation on the shop 
floor. The technology is relatively simple with numerous looms and workers engaged in 
the same task. Performance is easy to measure and is indeed measured at high frequency. 
The output lost due to repair, re-tooling, delays in supplies, or low effort are carefully 
observed and analysed. The required level of worker’s effort is dictated by the number of 
looms per worker and the probability of yarn-break with even latter known ex ante with 
some precision. I try to benefit from this abundance of information adding results from 
previous research carried out in the same weaving mill (Köllő, 1982). The data relating to 
the transition period were collected in 1998-1999 and are available on request. An 
overview is given in Appendix 2.  
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The plant has always belonged to a hierarchically organised textile firm operating a 
spinning plant, a weaving mill and other departments engaged in the preparatory and 
finishing stages of manufacturing. About 2/3 of the weavery’s output was sold on the 
market during the period of observation with 1/3 of the cloth processed further in a 
clothing department producing linen, table-linen, handkerchiefs and – more recently – 
shirts. 
Figure 2: Full-capacity output and unit labor cost 1988-96 (log scale) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A brief overview of the plant’s history during the transition is provided in Figure 2 
showing how the size of the plant (measured with potential output under the assumption 
that all looms operate continuously) and ULC were changing relative to 1988. The 
vertical lines indicate the dates of changes in ownership. The firm was one of the first 
Hungarian companies privatised for foreigners in 1989. The new owners left the size of 
the plant unchanged and tried to earn higher profits by increasing labor input and making 
major cuts in wages. The failure of this expansive strategy is clearly shown by a dramatic 
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rise of ULC in 1989-91 that forced the owners to declare bankruptcy. From late 1991 to 
1994 the firm was owned by its main creditor, a commercial bank, undertaking the major 
steps of restructuring. The size of the weaving plant was halved in this period and ULC 
fell rapidly. By the end of the period the firm was considered ready for sale and actually 
sold to a large textile company. The weavery was operated under basically steady 
conditions thereafter – neither its size nor its technology changed substantially in the late 
1990s.
1 
Table 1: Selected indicators of the weaving mill 1988-1991 
 
 1988 1989 1990  1991
  ----   Years preceding bankruptcy ----  Bankruptcy
(A) Inputs and output   
Number of looms  100 91.1 82.3  73.4
Hours paid (weavers)  100 103.8 113.4  113.6
Maximum available output of looms
1  100 99.8 99.5 76.0
Output
  100 96.3 92.5 60.6
(B) Wages   
CPI-adjusted real average wage of weavers  100 92.6 86.8  88.0
PPI-adjusted real average wage of weavers
2  .. 100 124.1 137.9
Unit labor cost  .. 100 141.1  239.9
Weavers’ wage relative to the alternative wage
3  .. 100 ..  84.9
(C) Other indicators   
Fraction unionised (weavers, per cent)  81.4 73.0 67.0  67.5
Overtime work (weavers, per cent of hours paid)  0.6 1.0 2.1  2.6
Days on sick leave (weavers, median)  11.1 4.6 4.3  0
1) Output if the looms operate non-stop during the scheduled workdays. Measured in square meters. 
2)  The plant`s PPI is measured with the price of cloth sold on the market . Not available for 1988. 
3) Alternative wage: the mean monthly earnings of female manual workers with primary school 
background and/or vocational qualification in spinning or weaving, in the macro-region of the firm. 
Data source: Wage Surveys 1989, 1992. The figure for 1991 is estimate assuming that the alternative 
wage changed in tandem with the economy-wide average wage in 1991-92. 
 
Before turning to the period of restructuring a more detailed summary is given of how the 
plant was reformed by its first private owners.  As shown in Table 1 the new owners 
sorted out about 18 per cent of the looms and in the same time expanded the hours of 
operation by starting a week-end shift comprising twelve-hours workdays on Saturdays 
                                                 
1 A second period of accumulating debts started after 2001 that was explained by fast-rising Hungarian 
labor costs, appreciation of the Forint, and growing competition on the part of low-wage Asian producers.  
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and Sundays. This increased the number of weavers from 255 in 1988 to 305 in 1991. 
(The workers - hired from outside for this particular task – made two shifts a week-end.). 
As a combined effect, the productive capacity of the plant remained practically 
unchanged until the year of the bankruptcy. Wages were cut substantially by 12-13 per 
cent in real terms and 21 percentage points relative to the weaver’s estimated outside 
option (introduced later). The falling level of unionisation; less days spent on sick leave; 
and more time worked overtime give further insights of how the bargaining position of 
workers was deteriorating in this period. 
Despite these ‘achievements’ the firm had to face fast-growing labor costs relative 
to productivity. The attempt to sell most simple textile products on a market opened for 
Asian and East-European competitors resulted in falling sales prices and booming ULC. 
In 1991 the owners (a group of young entrepreneurs nicknamed by the workers as the 
‘silk scarves’) had to declare bankruptcy and move over in favor of the main creditor’s 
trustees. 
3. RESTRUCTURING 
The following sections analyze the firm’s decisions over equipment, workers, effort 
requirements, wages and other factors influencing ULC. The analysis relates to 1991-96 
or 1991-97 depending on data availability. At the end of the section the change in ULC is 
decomposed to show the relative importance of the particular decisions. Throughout the 
paper the attention is restricted to the weavers and the weaving looms. 
3.1. Selecting the equipment 
The size of the factory was roughly halved in the period of restructuring. This, first of all, 
meant a reduction of the equipment with the number of looms falling by 53 % between  
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1991 and 1997. The selection was non-random and resulted in a major growth of output 
per loom. Table 2 decomposes productivity change to a compositional effect (the 
hypothetical change in the average product in case each of the 5 types of looms were 
operated at its 1991 productivity level); a component capturing the productivity growth 
within types of looms, and an interactive effect. With qjt designating productivity and n jt 
standing for the share of type j looms at time t the three components are calculated as: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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Table 2: Change of output per weaving loom between 1991 and 1997 
 
  1991-94 1994-97 1991-97 
Percentage change, of which:  +51.0  -15.1  +29.5 
Compositional change (C
1)  +33.8 +1.9 +39.6 
Productivity change (C
2) +15.7  -17.1  -2.9 
Interactions (C
3) +1.5  +0.0  -7.1 
 
The decomposition suggests that the growth in output per loom between 1991 and 1997 
was entirely accounted for by the selection effect (C1) with the productivity of the 
individual looms (C2) increasing in 1991-94 but falling thereafter. 
3.2. Selecting the workers 
Total labor input measured in hours fell by 64.4 % between 1991 and 1996 and the 
number of weavers (all of them women) dropped from 305 to 97. The largest cut in 
employment came in 1991-93 when nearly all workers of foreign citizenship, 83 per cent 
of the weavers attending outdated mechanical looms on the week-end shifts, and 45 per 
cent of the rest of the workers were laid off. The criteria applied in screening are first 
examined by annual probits with the dependent variable set equal to 1 if a weaver on the 
payroll left by the end of the year, and 0 otherwise. The probability of exit is related to  
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age, tenure, marital status, health status, union membership, and the type of loom 
attended by the weaver (Table 3).  
Table 3: Separation from the plant in 1988-1995 – Probits, marginal effects 
Dependent: Left the plant until the end of the year. Sample: Weavers on the payroll 
 
Year Age 
 
 
Age
2 
/100
 
Min.  
prob. 
at age
 
Tenure 
 
 
Days on 
sick 
leave % 
Married 
 
 
Union 
member 
 
Old type 
loom 
 
Fired or 
quitted 
% 
1988  -.0024   .0409  ..  -.0046 .0067
***   .0175  -.0980  -.0301  .1942 
1989   .0126 -.0191  ..  -.0131
***  .0096
***  -.0308 -.0175 -.0098 .2539 
1990 -.0630
***   .1078
*** 29.2  -.0014 .0108
***   .1012   .0136  -.0561  .2698 
1991
1  -.0939
***   .1448
*** 31.5  -.0027 .0152
***   .2049
*** -.0233    .0833  .4000 
1992 -.0801
***   .1368
*** 29.3  -.0176
*** .0295
***   .1425   .0918   .2045
*** .3680 
1993 -.0848
***   .1159
* 36.6  -.0018  .0813
***   .2065
***   .0528  -.0637  .1985 
1994 -.0861
***   .1197
*** 36.0  -.0024 .0037   .1409
**   .0486   .1230
* .1182 
1995 -.0014   .0011  ..  -.0011 .0009    .0055 -.0113   .0005 .1212 
Significant at the *) 0.1 **) 0.05 ***) 0.01 level 
 
Most of the estimated effects followed a bell-shaped time path with the strongest 
influence exerted in 1990-93 - the years of the bankruptcy procedure and the subsequent 
major down-sizing. In one or several years during this period the workers younger or 
older than 30, those with short tenures, married women, people coping with health 
problems, and those working with obsolete equipment were at significantly higher risk of 
losing their jobs than others. Before and after this period the observed variables had no or 
had weak effect on the probability of separation. (Union membership had no effect in any 
year). The age profile of exit changed markedly, with the minimum of the exit probability 
being at 30 years of age during the redundancies but 36 afterwards. 
Table 4 gives a more precise account of the selection criteria during 1990-93 
using the discrete time duration model proposed by Jenkins (1995). In this case the units 
of observation are the annual job spells of the weavers. (New entrants are added to the 
risk group.) Tenure is measured with dummies allowing for non-monotonous baseline 
hazard;  marital status is interacted with age; citizenship is included, and the model is also  
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estimated using the lagged value of the health status variable. This is required because the 
contemporaneous proportion of days spent on sick leave may be endogenous as long as 
the workers facing lay-off may go for ‘sickness holiday’ to search for jobs or have a rest.  
 
Table 4: Discrete time duration model of separation from the plant in the period of down-
sizing  – Logit form, piece-wise baseline hazard, marginal effects  and Z-values 
 
Dependent: Fired/quitted by the end of the year  1990-1993  1991-1993 
Age  -.0852 5.00  -.0902 3.07 
Age squared (/100)   .1494  5.75   .1597  3.65 
Tenure<1 year
1  -.0360 0.82  -.1097 0.56 
Tenure 5-10 years
  -.0891 1.98  -.0858 1.13 
Tenure 10-15 years  -.0631  1.16  -.0245  0.24 
Tenure > 15 years  -.2059  4.61  -.2200  3.23 
Married × Age 16-34   .1304  2.75   .1582  1.91 
Married × Age 35-50  -.0215 0.37  -.0314 0.36 
Days on sick leave (lagged in the second column)
2   .0076  4.69   .0100  2.91 
Non-Hungarian citizen   .4709  9.55   .6996  13.02 
Old type loom  .1063  2.95   .1999  3.32 
Week-end shift   .1415  2.45   .2335  2.89 
1991 .0423  1.05  ..  .. 
1992  .2352 4.60  .2349 3.51 
1993  .0814 1.27  .0922 1.12 
Number of observations  918  546 
Pseudo R
2  0.1617 0.2380 
1) Reference: 1-5 years  2) Measured as a percentage of all days in work and sick leave 
 
The results tell more than the cross-section estimates at several points. The effect of 
tenure appears to be non-monotonous. Workers who spent 15 or more years with the firm 
had about 20 % lower risk of dismissal while the differences in tenures shorter than that 
had no effect. Discrimination by marital status was restricted to younger workers – most 
of them mothers of small children – who had 13% higher risk compared to their 
unmarried counterparts. The ‘Gästarbeiters’, mostly ethnic Hungarians commuting across 
the border had almost 50 % higher probability of losing their jobs than had the 
incumbents. The finding that the lagged value of the health variable had similar, even  
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slightly stronger, effect than had its contemporaneous value clearly signals the bias 
against workers coping with illness. The magnitude of the bias is easy to calculate given a 
one standard deviation band of 13 % of the sick leave variable and a marginal effect of 1 
%. Reasons specific to the production process rather than the individual worker (such as 
having a job in the week-end shift or attending an obsolete loom) increased the 
probability of exit by 10-15 %. While unobserved differences evidently played a role in 
the selection process, as suggested by the pseudo-R
2 values of 0.16 and 0.24 of the logits, 
the effects of the observables leave no doubt that current productivity was the main 
consideration during the down-sizing process. 
3.3. Utilizing the looms 
The actual output of a weaving mill lags behind its potential output because of 
various types of breaks in operations. A part of the potential time frame is devoted to 
repair, maintenance, and the changing of thread, or wasted for the lack of inputs (t
S). 
Another part is lost during the seconds or minutes elapsing between yarn-breaks and the 
weaver’s intervention (t
W). An overview of how these breaks were changing over time is 
given in Table 5. Appendix 1 explains how t
W was estimated. 
The time lost due to repair, maintenance, re-tooling and lack of inputs (t
S) had a 
historically increasing trend starting from about 5 per cent in 1957-70, just above 10 per 
cent in 1971-78 and 1988, 20 per cent during the restructuring period, and 25 per cent 
after the plant’s restructuring.  
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Table 5: Output lost due to breaks of different kind 1957-97 
Year t
S  t
W 
1957-60 6.1  . 
1961-65 4.8  . 
1966-70 5.4  . 
1971 10.0  21.6 
1972 10.9  20.2 
1973 9.6  20.0 
1974 11.9  18.4 
1975 12.9  18.9 
1976 12.1  16.4 
1977 12.3  14.7 
… .  . 
1988 10.7  12.3 
… .  . 
1991 16.6  22.0 
1992 19.8  15.8 
1993 25.0  16.3 
1994 17.6  9.7 
1995 21.3  11.2 
1996 24.9  12.7 
1997 29.0  11.6 
 
This rise was strongly affected by the growth of quasi-idleness required to adjust the 
looms to changing orders. A weaving plant inevitably loses time for changing cylinders 
and yarn – the smaller and more variable the batches the more time is `wasted’ for this. 
The curve in Figure 3 depicts how two major components within t
S were changing 
between 1991 and 1997. The time loss explained by changing thread and cylinder was 
rising rapidly after 1994 as the firm shifted to smaller batches and a wider assortment of 
clothes. The losses explained by unavailable inputs such as absent workers and 
undelivered thread or compartments were at low levels in 1991 when production 
plummeted during the bankruptcy procedure, and jumped high during the period of 
down-sizing and relocation bringing about disturbances in co-operation. In 1994-97 the 
time lost for shortages stayed around  6 % level. The patterns of change are supportive of 
Kornai`s (1980) notions of the `supply constrained’ socialist versus the `demand 
constrained’ capitalist firms.   
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Figure 3: Time lost for two types of reasons, 1991-1997 
Per cent of the total time base 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turning back to Table 5 we find that the time lost because of delays in the weavers’ 
interventions (t
W) followed a historically decreasing trend with its average value being 19 
per cent in 1971-77 and 13 per cent in 1991-97. However, t
W was at a 12.3 per cent level 
already in 1988 and did not improve later. This is basically explained by the limits of 
increasing work effort as discussed in the next section. 
3.4. Increasing work effort 
The required level of effort on the part of a weaver is determined by the predicted 
probability of yarn-break known ex ante with some precision. There is an optimal number 
of interventions per hour that fully exhausts the weaver’s worktime on the one hand, and 
ensures that no loom is left unattended, on the other.  
The trade-off between effort and productivity (the ratio of actual to potential output 
of the looms under a weaver’s supervision) is illustrated by Figure 4. The sketch shows 
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how the potential and actual yields of the looms are expected to grow as the productive 
capacity under a weaver’s control is extended. The size of the capacity attended by the 
weaver (horizontal axis) is measured  with the potential output of the looms under her 
control that also implies a particular frequency of yarn-breaks and a particular level of 
required effort.  
Figure 4: Actual and potential ouput per worker 
 
 
When the firm is in regime A the increases in the potential output bring about 
proportional increases in the actual output provided that the workers are properly 
monitored and the required level of effort is enforced. At the optimal level of required 
effort (E) output per worker is the highest among all effort standards ensuring the full 
utilization of the equipment. Beyond this point, in regime B, any further increase in the 
prescribed workload reduces the ratio of actual to potential output and adds to ULC. 
Setting effort requirements stricter than E is irrational since the plant would be better off 
by choosing E and hiring additional workers to attend the looms left without supervision.   
Potential output ⇒ yarn-breaks ⇒ effort
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The optimal effort requirement is not known with certainty – it is approximated with 
the aid of preparatory calculations, learning from past experience, and trial-and-error. As 
a benchmark the firm adapted an internationally acknowledged standard of 41 
interventions per hour. As shown in Figure 5 the required level was set at 20-25 
interventions in 1968-76 and above 41 in all years but one between 1991 and 1997. 
 
Figure 5: Interventions per hour. 1968-76 and 1991-97 annual means 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why was the effort requirement set deep below the acknowledged standard under 
socialism? The reasons were rooted in the logic of the production process under supply 
constraints. As the output target was high relative to the number of auxiliary and repair 
workers (among others) weavers were expected to perform a series of supplementary 
tasks including material handling, search for compartments and thread, and the fixing of 
their looms. During the transition, as the plant re-established a clear division of tasks the 
weavers could devote their entire time frame to their own job and the firm could set the 
0
20
40
60
1968-1976 1991-1997 
16 
effort requirements closer to the standard. This also implies that the actual workload did 
not grow as fast as suggested by the doubling of the number of interventions. 
While the growth in worker effort is difficult to assess it seems that by setting the 
level at 42-45 interventions an hour the plant shifted to regime B. This can be 
demonstrated by estimating the linkage between changes of the required level of effort 
and changes of productivity. Data on this are available for 5 types of looms and 75 
months between 1991 and 1997. Using this panel equation (2) relates the productivity of 
loom type i at time t (NETit) to the required level of effort (e
*
it); time interval dummies 
capturing the effort-unrelated improvements in productivity (T); type-of-loom fixed 
effects (ci); and an error term uit. The NET productivity  measure is defined as the ratio of 
actual output to the maximum available output under the actual duration of operation 
(time frame less breaks for reasons other than delays in the weaver’s intervention, as 
described in detail in Appendix 1). In the equation e
*
it is measured relative to the 41 
interventions/hour standard. In regime B the key coefficient β1 is expected to be negative. 
) 2 ( ln ln 2 1 it i t it u c T e NET + + + =
∗ β β  
The estimate of β1 from the fixed effects regression is -0.12 suggesting that the 
fluctuations of e
* within its two standard deviations band resulted up to 4.7 percentage 
points shifts of opposite direction in productivity (Table 6) 
2. The fixed effects coefficient 
may be attenuated by an omitted variable bias, however. The actual effort requirements 
(e) are dictated by the actual frequency of yarn-breaks – this may deviate from e
* due to 
unforeseen deviations in thread quality, humidity, or other factors affecting the 
probability that a loom stops. Denoting the deviations with ε we have eit =e
*
it+εit in a 
                                                 
2 The equality of the fixed and random effects coefficients is accepted at a 0.98 level in the Hausman-test.  
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structural equation and supposedly Cov(e
*ε)< 0.  When, for instance, thread quality turns 
out to be poor in practice, and the residual productivity β1εit+uit falls the management 
may be tempted to lower e
* in order to maintain high levels of NET. 
3 
 
Table 6: Productivity and effort 1991-97 - Estimates of equation (2) and system (3) 
Dependent variable: ratio of actual to potential output (log) 
Model:  Fixed effects  Multiple indicators IV 
Instrument for effort  --  No. of looms attended 
Required effort (log)  -0.1158 (0.0430)
***  -0.2688 (0.1625)
* 
Restructuring (1992-94)   0.0756 (0.0228)
 *** 0.0764  (0.0232)
 *** 
Post-restructuring (1995-97)   0.1128 (0.0233)
 *** 0.1221  (0.0256)
 *** 
Constant   4.883  5.6009 
R
2  within / between / overall  0.0768 / 0.2480 / 0.0840  0.0457 / 0.2596 / 0.0695 
Observations / groups / max months  357 / 5 / 74  357 / 5 / 74 
Standard errors in brackets. Significant at the *) 0.1 ***) 0.01 level 
 
While the fixed effects model assumes that e
*
it is a precise measure of eit, in an alternative 
specification tested the assumption is that the level of required effort is unobserved. 
Instead of the true level we have observations on two correlated indicators: e
*and the 
number of looms attended by a weaver n
*. This is analogous to the problem addressed in 
the multiple indicators IV models (Woolridge, 2002, 105-106) in that we have a 
structural equation with eit being unobserved and two indicators correlated with eit. If the 
indicators are redundant in the structural equation (being proxies they evidently are), and 
δ1≠0, ρ1≠0, and Cov(v1v2 ) =0 hold any of the two proxies can be used as an instrument 
for the other to get consistent estimate of β1. 
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3 We can reasonably assume that the adjustment process is fast enough not to produce lagged effects in a  
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The assumption of uncorrelated errors states that any correlation between the 
proxies arises through their common dependence on e. This is not necessarily met in our 
case because the managers’ misperceptions of e may result in positively correlated errors. 
Therefore, while the estimate of β1 in the fixed effects model is lower-bound the one from 
the IV is predictably upper-bound. Estimating (2) using n
* as an instrument for e
* yields a 
coefficient of β1= -0.27 (significant at the 0.09 level) that implies 5.7 percentage points 
productivity differential at the margins of the two standard deviations band of e
*. There is 
a minor difference of the expected sign between the fixed effects and the IV coefficients 
but their suggestions are similar: the plant arrived at a margin where further increases in 
the prescribed workload resulted in falling levels of capacity utilization.   
3.5. Decreasing wages 
The decline in weavers’ real wages started, but did not come to an end, under the first 
private owners of the enterprise. The CPI-adjusted average real hourly wage fell from 
64.8 Ft in 1988 to 53.4 Ft in 1991 and, following a short period or recovery, a low of 44.2 
Ft in 1996. A loss of similar magnitude can be observed when the weaver’s wages are 
compared to their outside option. This was calculated as the regional mean wage of 
female workers employed as unskilled/semi-skilled laborers or spinners/weavers. This 
choice is justified by the observation that the overwhelming majority of the weavers who 
quit their employers are hired for low-skilled jobs (Köllő, 1982).
4 Data on outside wages 
were available in 1989 and each year in 1992-96. In 1989 the plant’s weavers earned 146 
% of the outside option – this comprised returns to being employed at a large, ‘politically 
important’ enterprise, reflected the impact of a wage grid where weaving was considered 
                                                                                                                                                 
monthly panel. q/Q is recorded on a daily basis and evaluated three times a month.  
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a skilled job, and the system of incentives discussed below. Privatisation evaporated a 
large part of the firm-specific earnings advantage that fell to 115 % in 1992 and 112 % in 
1996.  Given that the wage advantage of workers employed in multiple shifts over the 
average worker amounted to 20 per cent in the region these latter percentages hint at 
earnings levels at (or even below) the alternative wage.
5  
 
Figure 6: Real hourly wages and relative monthly earnings of weavers 1988-96 
Annual means and one standard deviation bands, log sacales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not only the level of wages but the way wages could be earned did change 
substantially during the transition. Under socialism incentives were based on the firm-
specific earnings rents, strong seniority (delayed payment), and a linear piece-rate system 
without setting lower limits to effort. This was consistent with the firm’s incentives to 
maximize output rather than efficiency and its ability to draw rents. The system of 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 ‘Regional’ stands for the NUTS-2 region of the enterprise and ‘wages’ are meant to be gross monthly 
earnings since hourly data are not available in the Wage Survey used to calculate the alternative wage. 
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payment by results was replaced by fixed hourly rates as early as 1990 while managers 
put more effort in monitoring the workers and enforcing a satisfactory level of effort.  
The elimination of the piece-rate scheme was stimulated by growing difficulties 
in finding reliable indicators for effort. As the firm moved to smaller batches the quantity 
produced became too noisy proxy to rely on – a problem that often undermines the 
practice of payment by results as discussed in Milgrom and Roberts (1999). Consistent 
with the shift to fixed wages the linkages between age, tenure and pay were eliminated as 
shown by the earnings functions of Table 7.  
Table 7: Real hourly wage equations 1988-95 
Dependent: Log hourly wage at 1988 consumer prices 
Dependent of the selection probit: was employed by the end of the year 
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Age   .0409
***   .0513
***   .0434
***   .0665
***   .0441
***   .0081   .0233
**   .0180
* 
Age squared (/100)  -.0569
*** -.0717
*** -.0646
*** -.0993
*** -.0706
*** -.0000  -.0277
* -.0206 
Tenure   .0076
***   .0055
***   .0087
***   .0098
***   .0081
***   .0012   .0027
*   .0016 
Old type loom   .0119   .0001  -.1252
*** -.0873
*** -.1497
*** -.1431
*** -.1264
*** -.0951
*** 
Week-end shift       -       -   .4869
***   .3001
***   .2615
***   .2737
***   .3313
***   .2260
*** 
New entrant  -.3025
*** -.1374
*** -.1272
*** -.0576
**   .0995
*   .0433   .0266  -.0854 
Constant  3.4121 3.2130 3.4779 2.7690 3.0882 3.6647 3.4280 3.4879 
λ   .0612
**  -.0191 -.0500   .1309
***   .0041   .0853
*** .1030
*** -.0760
*** 
Nobs  232 207 307 305 193 131 110  99 
The wage equation is estimated for weavers employed by the end of the year with the selection equation 
including age, age squared, dummy for tenure longer than 15 years, marital status, days on sick leave, and 
citizenship. Pro memo items (exit and entry as per cent of the weavers on the year’s payroll): 
Exit  19.4 25.4 26.9 40.0 36.9 19.9 11.8 12.2 
Entry  11.6 23.8 39.7 24.6 5.2  6.9  4.6  2.0 
Significant at the *) 0.1 **) 0.05 ***) 0.01 level 
Similarly to the case of effort requirements it seems that the firm has reached the limits of 
further savings on wages. This is indicated by the wage differential between new entrants 
and incumbent workers in Table 7. While until 1991 the plant was able to hire workers at 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 This regression-based approximative calculation relies on the 1998 wave of the Wage Survey where shift 
work was distinguished with a dummy variable. No similar information was available prior to 1998.  
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wages deep below the incumbent’s earnings the gap completely disappeared by 1992 as 
the firm-specific earnings rents were eliminated.  
Figure 7: Time lost for the shortages of weavers 1968-78 and 1988-97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The proximity of the limits is also shown by the time wasted for the lack of weavers. 
What the plant records under this heading is how long were some looms entirely 
withdrawn from production thus it is part of t
S not t
W. As shown in Figure 7 no time was 
lost for this reason at all in 1988 and 1991 but starting from the early 1990s labor 
shortages reached the levels characteristic of the early 1970s. 
3.6. Residual effects 
There are important actions affecting ULC including improvements in marketing, design, 
and organization, which are difficult or impossible to observe. The only way to learn 
about them is to try to measure their combined influence on ULC as a residual effect.  
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At this aim formula (4) decomposes the change in ULC to factors that definitely do not 
reflect improvements in corporate management and others, which at least potentially do. 
Denoting wages and employment with w and L, the alternative wage with w
*, output with 
Q, and prices with p
C (consumer prices), p
T (sales prices in textiles) and p (sales prices of 
the firm) equation (4) results in six components. Proceeding from the left to the right the 
components capture the change in the firm-specific earnings rent, change in the 
alternative real wage, the wedge between consumer prices and the textile industry’s sales 
prices, the wedge between the firm’s and the industry’s sales prices, capacity utilization, 
and the change in the potential productivity of labor. The second and the third 
components are given for the firm while the first and the last need no innovative actions 
on the part of the management. However, both the growth of relative prices (p/p
T) and the 
improvements in capacity utilization (Q/Q
max) can be attributed to managerial effort to a 
large extent.  
Table 8: The components of log change in unit labor costs, 1991-96 
  
Alternative CPI-adjusted real wage   -0.088 
Firm specific earnings rent  -0.102 
   
Wedge between the CPI and the textiles industry’s PPI  0.316 
Wedge between the firm’s PPI and the textile industry’s PPI  -0.294 
  
Improvement in capacity utilization  -0.015 
Improvement in potential output/worker  -0.600 
 
Total log change in ULC 
 
-0.772 
ULC: unit labor cost, CPI: consumer price index, PPI: producer price index 
 
As shown in Table 8 the wedge between consumer and producer prices increased the 
plant’s ULC by almost 1/3 that was only partly offset by the fall of the alternative real 
wage. Starting from this augmented level the plant’s ULC was roughly halved by actions 
under the management’s control. The growth in potential labor productivity (down-sizing  
23 
combined with asset stripping) had far the largest contribution to this – about six times as 
important as the cutting of wages and twice as large as the contribution of price increases.  
Arguably, the increase in the firm’s relative sales price gives an upper-bound 
estimate of returns to better management, design and organization. First, as was discussed 
earlier, there is a trade-off between product quality and capacity utilization. The failure to 
improve the latter should be accounted as a cost paid for better quality and the timely 
delivery of smaller and smaller batches - this deductible reduces the net return to 
managerial efforts. Second, the price improvements themselves contained a 
compositional effect as the firm stopped producing some low-priced products such as 
bed-linen and napkins formerly delivered for state orders. However, even if we attribute 
the entire change in relative prices and natural productivity to innovation its contribution 
to the total decrease of ULC amounts to only about 30% as opposed to 60% gained by the 
selection of the inherited equipment and 10% explained by wage cuts – neither requiring 
sophisticated managerial skills. 
4. LESSONS FOR RESEARCH 
The way in which the weaving mill was transformed was by no means unique – there is 
sufficient anecdotal evidence of similar cases highlighting the importance of the inherited 
assets used as a source of rents either by ‘skimming the cream’ of the equipment or using 
it as a flexibility reserve. In a case study of an engine plant 1990-97 Károly Fazekas 
(Fazekas and Köllő, 1998) reported an output loss over 90%, employment cuts exceeding 
50%, and virtually no change in the size of ‘plant and equipment’. The inherited pool of 
machines was used as a buffer in meeting orders for small batches. Centrum, once 
Hungary’s largest chain of department stores cut its real turnover by 82%, employment  
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by 60%, and the total space of shops by only 18% between 1988 and 1997, creating a 
unique abundance of assets relative to current inputs and turnover (Centrum, 1988).  
  In evaluating the macro-economic importance of a multitude of similar cases one 
has to consider, first of all, that the share of economic units surviving from socialism may 
have been significantly higher than suggested by the financial datasets. There is no way 
to prove this statement but there are pieces of statistical evidence hinting at severe bias in 
the firm-level data sets customarily used to assess the pace of change.  
  A survey of the EBRD conducted in 2000 (Commander and Köllő, 2002),  which 
contained detailed questions on firm histories revealed that 44 % of the private 
enterprises in the random sample existed as a state firm or part of a state firm in 1989 and 
had an equipment older than 10 years, that is, inherited from socialism. A survey of 
inflows to unemployment conducted by Hungary’s National Labor Center (NLC) in 1994 
suggested that 43.9% of the job losers worked in the same enterprise as in 1989 while the 
firm-level observations of the Wage Survey from the same year suggested a share of only 
16.5 %.
6 It might also be mentioned that the Firm analysed in this paper appeared six 
times as a dying and/or newly established enterprise in the firm-level data sets – 
whenever its owners changed between 1988 and 1995 - while the company was 
continuously operating in its century-old building. 
  There is scarce evidence suggesting that the surviving units basically relied on 
their inherited assets without major investment and modernization. Table 9 presents data 
from a panel of firms surviving 1990-94 without changing ID. Less than 1/10 of these 
firms reported investments in 1992-94, more than half of them had unused capacities, and 
                                                 
6 Author’s calculation using the original data sets.  
25 
the majority of them maintained the underutilized assets – waiting for better days or using 
them as reserves in the way discussed earlier.  
 
Table 9: Selected indicators of continuos firms 1990-94, % 
Sample: Firms bearing the same ID in 1990 and 1994  
 
  Activates new capacity 
within 6 months 
Has underutilized capacity   Underutilized capacities not 
sold / sorted out 
  All firms (N=928) 
1992 8.3  55.5  61.1 
1993 8.5  57.5  70.5 
1994 8.3  54.9  72.1 
 Manufacturing  (N=257) 
1992 9.8  55.5  73.5 
1993 7.3  57.2  80.4 
1994 6.6  55.4  78.5 
Source: Author’s calculations using the 1992-94 August-December waves of the Short-term Labor Market 
Prognosis Survey of the Hungarian National Labor Center 
 
A similar picture emerges from the EBRD survey suggesting that 47% of the private 
firms originating in socialist times did not introduce new product in 1997-2000 and 39% 
did not upgrade any of its existing product lines. While as much as ¾ of these firms were 
profitable in 2000 they had inferior performance in terms of job creation with 43.5% of 
them destroying jobs in 1997-2000 as opposed to only 25.6% with other private firms.
7 
  These data draw the attention to a kind of heterogeneity within the post-transition 
population of firms that cannot be captured by indicators like ownership or current 
profitability. Many of the currently successful private firms came into being by the sort of 
initial restructuring described in this case study. They are on the market but the decision 
on their survival is yet to come when their assets need to be replaced and the resulting 
capital costs should be covered from their intakes. Most probably, many of these firms 
has yet approached the limits in wage cuts and effort requirements as was the case in the 
                                                 
7 The data quoted here partly appear in Commander and Köllő (2002) but some of them result from new 
calculations using the original data set.  
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weaving plant. Since the past successes of the firms relied on actions that did not require 
innovation, technological renewal, high levels of adaptability, or outstanding managerial 
skills their future remains uncertain and quite a few of them will predictably fail when 
new challenges like the speed-up of wage convergence and growing competitive 
pressures after the EU accession are to responded.  
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Appendix 1: Estimating the time lost for delays in the weaver’s interventions 
The management observes three indicators of losses: t
S is the time lost for reasons outside 
the weaver’s control such as maintenance, repair, lack of inputs, and so on. GROSS is the 
ratio of actual to potential output thus 1-GROSS is the output lost during the breaks 
lasting for t
S + t
W hours. (t
W denotes the time until the looms are waiting for the weavers). 
NET is the output lost during 1-t
S hours of operation. Denoting the potential product of a 
loom during a period with qi and writing it in a mean-deviation form the following 
connections hold: 
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Since NET, GROSS and t
S are observed by the management t
W can be easily calculated 
provided that the relative productivity of the looms and their time-waist are uncorrelated. 
The validity of this assumption can be checked by looking at the difference between 
GROSS and its estimate under the simplifying conditions discussed above (δ): 
NET t GROSS GROSS Est GROSS
S ⋅ − − = − = ) 1 ( ) ( δ   
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The data suggest that the interaction effects were indeed negligible with the exception of 
1976 and 1991. The mean of δ was 0.003 in the 15 years for which observations were 
available. Therefore t
W=(1-NET)(1-t
S)=1-GROSS-t
S can be accepted as a measure of the 
time lost for delays in the weaver’s intervention. 
 
Table A1. Annual estimates and estimation errors of t
W 
year     GROSS    NET           t
s              t
w           δ 
1971      0.684      0.769      0.100      0.216     -0.008 
1972      0.689      0.771      0.109      0.202      0.002 
1973      0.704      0.782      0.096      0.200     -0.003 
1974      0.697      0.793      0.119      0.184     -0.002 
1975      0.682      0.796      0.129      0.189     -0.011 
1976      0.715      0.768      0.121      0.164      0.040 
1977      0.730      0.814      0.123      0.147      0.016 
1988      0.770      0.862      0.107      0.123      0.001 
1991      0.614      0.818      0.166      0.220     -0.069 
1992      0.644      0.805      0.198      0.158     -0.001 
1993      0.587      0.791      0.250      0.163     -0.006 
1994      0.727      0.896      0.176      0.097     -0.011 
1995      0.675      0.863      0.213      0.112     -0.004 
1996      0.624      0.825      0.249      0.127      0.004 
1997      0.594      0.845      0.290      0.116     -0.006 
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Appendix 2: Data sources and descriptive statistics 
Table A2: Data sources 
Variable  Frequency  Frequency  Unit of measurement, notes 
Number of looms  April 1991-July 1997  Monthly  By types of looms 
Output  April 1991-July 1997  Monthly  Weft-yarns, by types of looms 
Sales price of the plant  1989-97  Annual  Price of the cloth sold on the market
Number of workers  1988-96  Annual   
      
Working hours  1988-96  Annual  Individuals 
Hours spent on sick leave  1998-96  Annual  Individuals 
Wages 1988-96  Annual  Individuals 
Alternative wage  1989, 1992-96  Annual  Individuals, Wage Survey 
      
Required effort (e*)  April 1991-July 1997  Monthly  By types of looms 
GROSS, NET, t
S, n*  April 1991-July 1997  Monthly  By types of loomes 
 
Table A2 : Selected variables of the weaving mill – Annual means 
 
Years:  88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 
Owner  (year-end)  State  For.  For.  Bank Bank Bank Bank  Priv  Priv   
Output (weft-yarns)  100  96.3 92.5 60.6 48.6 37.7 40.2 39.9 39.1  .. 
Number of looms  100  91.1 82.3 73.4 48.3 36.1 32.8 32.8 32.9 35.1 
Full-capacity output  100  99.8 99.5 76.0 58.1 49.4 42.6 45.6 48.2  .. 
Hours paid (weavers)  100  103.8  113.4  113.6  74.2  53.3  45.2  38.4  40.2  .. 
Sales  price  of  cloth  ..  100  113.3 131.1 149.5 183.9 232.9 305.3 363.7 466.8 
- relative to textiles  ..  100  97.0  86.0  88.0  98.2  112.7  115.6  115.4  .. 
- relative to manufactur.  ..  100  92.8  81.0  82.2  91.3  103.9  105.6  102.5  108.1 
Real    wage*  100 92.6 86.8 82.4 72.3 81.0 84.4 76.4 68.2  .. 
Real  wage  cost**  100  95.8  118.9 132.1 124.5 139.4 136.2 120.5 115.3  .. 
Relative  wage***            
-  national  mean=100  100  99 81 83 77 79 70 74 68  .. 
- relevant market = 100    146     115 119 116 118 112  .. 
Capacity  utilization            
- gross  100  93.2 86.4 79.7 83.6 76.2 94.4 87.6 81.0 77.1 
- net  100  98.3 96.7 95.0 93.4 91.8  103.9  100.0  95.7 98.0 
- breaks (t
S+t
W+δ)  100  118.3 136.8 155.1 185.0 233.6 164.1 199.4 232.6 271.2 
Interventions/hour  ..  ..  ..  100 103.9  104.0 96.0  88.5 106.6  111.9 
Union members (%)  81.4  73.0  67.0  67.5 66.3 66.4 63.6 61.2 69.1  .. 
The plant-level figures relating to 1989 and 1990, if printed in italics, are interpolated using observed values 
from 1988 and January-May 1991. *) Average hourly wage deflated with the consumer price index. **) 
Average hourly wage deflated with the plant’s sales prices ***) Average monthly wage of weavers employed 
on weekday shifts, throughout the year compared to the national average and the regional and occupational 
average as defined in the text. All figures were provided by the enterprise except nationwide and local wages 
which were taken from the Wage Survey, waves 1986, 1989 and 1992-96. 
 
  
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF 1/27/04 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 646: Employment Expectations and Gross Flows by Type of Work 
Contract 
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Miguel Á. Malo 
Jan. 2004 
No. 645: Transition on the Shop Floor - The Restructuring of a Weaving 
Mill, Hungary 1988-97 
János Köllő Jan.  2004 
No. 644: Fighting “Low Equilibria” by Doubling the Minimum Wage ? 
Hungary’s Experiment 
Gábor Kertei and János Köllő Jan.  2004 
No. 643: Mind the Break! Accounting for Changing Patterns of Growth 
during Transition 
Jan Fidrmuc and Ariane Tichit  Jan. 2004 
No. 642: The Monetary Approach to Exchange Rates in the CEECs  Jesús Crespo-Cuaresma, Jarko 
Fidrmuc and Ronald MacDonald 
Jan. 2004 
No. 641: Community Norms and Organizational Practices: The 
Legitimization of Wage Arrears in Russia, 1992-1999 
John S. Earle, Andrew Spicer and 
Klara Sabirianova Peter 
Jan. 2004 
No. 640: Trust in Transition: Cross Country and Firm Evidence  Martin Raiser, Alan Rousso, and 
Franklin Steves 
Jan. 2004 
No. 639: What Makes Small Firms Grow? Finance, Human Capital, 
Technical Assistance, and the Business Environment in Romania 
J. David Brown, John S. Earle 
and Dana Lup 
Jan. 2004 
No. 638: The Politics of Economic Reform in Thailand: Crisis and 
Compromise 
Allen Hicken  Jan. 2004 
No. 637: How Much Restructuring did the Transition Countries 
Experience?  Evidence from Quality of their Exports 
Yener Kandogan  Jan. 2004 
No. 636: Estimating the Size and Growth of Unrecorded Economic 
Activity in Transition Countries: A Re-Evaluation of Eclectric 
Consumption Method Estimates and their Implications 
Edgar L. Feige and Ivana Urban  Dec. 2003 
No. 635: Measuring the Value Added by Money  Vlad Ivanenko  Nov. 2003 
No. 634: Sensitivity of the Exporting Economy on the External Shocks: 
Evidence from Slovene Firms 
Janez Prašnikar, Velimir Bole, 
Aleš Ahcan and Matjaž Koman 
Nov. 2003 
No. 633: Reputation Flows: Contractual Disputes and the Channels for 
Inter-firm Communication 
William Pyle  Nov. 2003 
No. 632: The Politics of Development Policy and Development Policy 
Reform in New Order Indonesia 
Michael T. Rock  Nov. 2003 
No. 631: The Reorientation of Transition Countries’ Exports: 
Changes in Quantity, Quality and Variety 
Yener Kandogan  Nov. 2003 
No. 630: Inequality of Outcomes and Inequality of Opportunities in 
Brazil 
François Bourguignon, Francisco 
H.G. Ferreira and Marta 
Menéndez 
Nov. 2003 
No. 629: Job Search Behavior of Unemployed in Russia  Natalia Smirnova  Nov. 2003 
No. 628: How has Economic Restructuring Affected China’s Urban 
Workers? 
John Giles, Albert Park, Feng Cai  Oct. 2003 
No. 627: The Life Cycle of Government Ownership  Jiahua Che  Oct. 2003 
No. 626: Blocked Transition And Post-Socialist Transformation: Siberia 
in the Nineties 
Silvano Bolcic   Oct. 2003 
No. 625: Generalizing the Causal Effect of Fertility on Female Labor 
Supply 
Guillermo Cruces and Sebastian 
Galiani 
Oct. 2003 
No. 624: The Allocation and Monitoring Role of Capital Markets: 
Theory and International Evidence 
Solomon Tadesse  Oct. 2003 
No. 623: Firm-Specific Variation and Openness in Emerging Markets  Kan Li, Randall Morck, Fan Yang 
and Bernard Yeung 
Oct. 2003 
No. 622: Exchange Rate Regimes and Volatility: Comparison of the 
Snake and Visegrad 
Juraj Valachy and Evžen 
Kočenda 
Oct. 2003 
No. 621: Do Market Pressures Induce Economic Efficiency?: The Case 
of Slovenian Manufacturing, 1994-2001 
Peter F. Orazem  and Milan 
Vodopivec 
Oct. 2003 
 